Supply Chain Security and the 2012 Olympics
There is just over a year until the London Summer Olympic Games
of 2012. And with the Games comes an extensive list of possible
threats, with negligence at one end of the scale and terrorism at
the other. Clearly, it is the threat of terrorism which is at the
forefront of the minds of policymakers and Olympic leaders. In this
article, Vega profiles the security implications that should be
considered across an extended supply operating within condensed
timescales and in full view of a watching world.
Background
Throughout its history, London has been the target of terrorist
attacks; from the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 to the 7/7 London bombings
exactly 400 years later.
The Olympic Games, likewise, have had to suffer the pain of
terrorist attack as extremists look for a high profile platform
from which to air their grievances. One thinks back to the
atrocities of the Black September terrorists at Munich in 1972, and
the Centennial Olympic Park bombing of the Atlanta games in 1996.
In London 2012, issues of security will be further complicated by a
wide variety of events timed around the Olympics, including
Wimbledon, Farnborough and the start of the football season.
Looking ahead therefore, there are many security considerations
to be reconciled, from attacks within and outside the boundaries of
the Olympic sites themselves to attacks all along the expanded
supply chain on which the Summer games will rely. These are
detailed in the
London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security
Strategy.
This article initially evaluates the potential vulnerability of
the supply chain to terrorists, and then considers what supply
chain organisations can do to minimise or even eliminate some of
the risks. The issues raised will apply not only to the Olympics
themselves, but also to the events around them, and will apply
beyond the Olympic sites to the broader range of Olympics-related
locations.
The variety of possible groups and individuals who will already
be considering how they can have a non-sporting impact at the
Olympics is far outstripped by the variety of ways in which they
can cause disruption, destruction and/or harm to competitors,
spectators, infrastructure or combination thereof. There are
potential targets both in the buildings and facilities at the
various Olympic sites, and in the transportation to the sites.
Security efforts traditionally aim to stop potential attackers from
achieving delivery of harmful personnel or materials to their
intended destinations, usually concentrating on making public
transportation safe and ensuring that private cars are kept away
from potential targets. Understandably, given traditional terrorist
modus operandi, these overlook the potential for the supply chain
being used as a means of delivery of harmful substances. Herein
there are many issues. The supply chain is not a simple single
route; it is a massive mixture of different products, routes and
means of delivery with potentially many steps in parts of the
process. Despite the complexity being mind-boggling, the
difficulties in rendering it relatively safe are by no means
insurmountable.
One horse has bolted already, to a large extent; substantial
volumes of concrete and other materials have entered the Olympic
site and environs to become intrinsic parts of the buildings and
facilities. It is not possible at this stage to ascertain what
level of security success can be applied to this early supply chain
– whether terrorists, or others bent on acts of subversion, were
able to compromise the quality of materials or to incorporate any
‘time bomb’ into the construction itself. However, this is not a
likely conduit – terrorist campaigns generally involve a degree of
immediacy (why wait several years to stage a spectacular attack
when you can do it tomorrow?), and for the purposes of this
article, it is assumed that the corresponding risks have been
managed.
Basic issues
The complexity of the Olympic supply chain is greater than would
normally be the case – firstly because of the limited time period
of the event, and secondly because of the declared ambition of the
London Olympics Organising Committee to ensure that small British
companies have substantial opportunities to become suppliers, at
least at a secondary level. The inevitable increased consumption
during the Olympics will also mean that many organisations in
Olympic supply chains will need to employ new, untried and unknown
staff. Equally inevitably, these factors increase the numbers of
people involved in the supply chain – and each additional
individual is an additional security risk.
The risks, in general, are associated with four vulnerable parts
of the supply chain:
- Materials which are to be delivered to Olympic sites (and hence
their production locations), whether food, clothing, sponsor’s
advertising materials, tourist tat or any other retailed goods
- Mobile Logistics facilities required, and goods vehicles, in
particular
- Stationary logistics locations, such as warehouses and
storerooms
- Retail outlets within the Olympic sites
It is essential that members of the supply chain recognise and
understand that security threats to the Olympics are not restricted
to the Olympic events, nor even to Olympic sites; a potential
threat can be introduced at any point in the supply chain and
delivered to any Olympic-related location.
Production
Those controlling the individual elements of the supply chain
noted above must carefully consider the possible range of threats
they face. The first points of vulnerability are production
locations where goods are manufactured and packed for delivery to
the Olympic sites. Since a single employee at any point in the
production process is capable of introducing contaminants or
impacting the quality of the product, employers and managers must
reinforce their standard practices to ensure they employ trusted
staff, and, where they are supplying the Olympics, be prepared to
divert their most reliable personnel to that end.
Foodstuffs will be among the products in most demand, and
contamination must be a substantial concern in this area. Hence,
the processes and procedures within the production facilities must
be particularly focused on quality control at all stages, and must
include testing for far more possibilities than would be the case
in conventional circumstances. This may mean, for some, checking
incoming products which they would trust to their suppliers’
quality regimes under normal circumstances. However, it should not
be assumed that such considerations should apply only to foodstuffs
– all suppliers face risks of a similar nature, and must prepare
accordingly.
Logistics
Risks facing the mobile logistics processes are manifold, and it
doesn’t take a scriptwriter from ‘Spooks’ to be aware that
substantial threats can be delivered by goods vehicles of all
sizes. The truck bombs used in 1983 to destroy US and French
military bases in the Lebanon are examples of one type, while the
approach used to attack Baghdad’s ‘Green Zone’ in August 2009 is
another. Neither scenario can be ignored in 2012, and for that
reason it must be assumed that there will be a substantial
investment in ensuring that delivery routes are kept apart from the
sites and routes to be used by the general public and the
athletes.
There are four stages at which action may be taken to reduce the
logistics-related risks:
- The point at which they are loaded
- Their arrival points at or near Olympic sites
- If and where freight vehicles travel along or near passenger
routes at the same time as spectators, athletes and officials
- Where freight vehicles encroach on spectator or athlete areas
within the Olympic sites
For each, simple actions can be taken which are capable of
minimising the risk, if not eliminating it. Some necessary actions
fall primarily under the aegis of the Olympic Authorities, but
suppliers and those further down the supply chain may also have
important roles to play.
Therefore, the loading of delivery vehicles throughout the
supply chain needs to be carefully monitored by both producers and
logistics companies. It is also essential that personnel involved
are appropriately screened, even if they are existing trusted
staff. If it is possible to insert checks on the loading process
which are not onerous for the business, then these are obviously
desirable too.
At the arrival points at or near Olympic sites, a delivery
vehicle and its manifest – and even its contents – may be checked
against planned receipts to ensure that the provenance of the items
being delivered is as anticipated. It can be expected that this
activity will be carried out by London 2012 officials, but it would
also be appropriate for the receiving organisation to warn such
officials of when they do and do not expect deliveries, and what
the contents will be – ideally not merely by the manifest that
arrives with the load. The onus will be on the delivering
organisation to ensure that they spring no surprises on the Olympic
security regime, and, therefore, delivery planning will be of
greater than usual significance.
As mentioned previously, it may be assumed that freight and
passenger routes will be separated for the duration of and
surrounding the Games, and the details of this will be the
responsibility of the London 2012 organisers. However, although it
is reasonable to assume that the routing issues will be managed by
the Olympic authorities, questions of delivery timing and vehicle
security will require logistics companies and logistics arms of
companies to consider very carefully the necessary constraints on
their normal processes and procedures. Should the organisers decide
that there should be specific times for deliveries, these must be
adhered to. Even if this is not the case, it may still make
considerable sense to make deliveries at what would, under normal
circumstances, be considered “inhospitable hours” – reducing the
risk of delays, as well as the risk to the public.
Similarly, the question of whether delivery vehicles operating
entirely within the Olympic sites will be allowed to encroach on
spectator or athlete areas will also be a decision for
the London 2012 organisers – although again it may be assumed
that insofar as is possible, the principle of separating goods and
people will apply here as elsewhere. The most important issue is
that supply chain partners work collaboratively to support the
efforts of the organisers, and are willing and able to adapt to
changing needs and demands which may be placed upon them by the
wide variety of events – from accidental to terrorist act – that
may threaten the coherence and even the viability of the supply
chain environment in which they operate.
Warehouses and Stores
Warehouses and store-rooms are two different types of storage
location, and in a supply chain context these are designed to
retain products for (ideally short) periods of time between
movements of inventory. As such, they are ideal places not only for
the storage of desired materials, but also for those materials
which are not desirable.
Clearly, the same principles apply as for production locations,
in that organisations will need to ensure that their staff are
trustworthy and reliable to an even greater degree than they would
for their own regular purposes. It is also important that there is
strong access security at all storage locations to minimise the
risk of tampering or theft of goods.
In order to minimise the risk of storage space being used for
unacceptable purposes, a variety of steps can be taken, the
majority of which are (or ought to be) standard practice. Checks
need to be made on materials entering and leaving storage locations
(particularly those locations within the Olympic sites), ideally
separately by at least two people. Random sampling of materials
entering storage should reduce the risk of unwanted and/or
compromised items, as should random sampling of materials already
in situ. Perpetual inventory techniques – supported by checks to
ensure that storage locations recorded on IT systems as being empty
actually are empty – are critical.
Outlets
The final steps in the London 2012 supply chain are the outlets
within the Olympic sites. These will be of various sizes and
provide a wide variety of products, but the key areas that need to
be considered are any storage facilities within them, which have
been referred to above and to which the same rules of access, stock
counts, sampling etc. apply, as for all warehouses and stores.
Retail outlets must ensure that it is impossible for the public to
contaminate or otherwise compromise their products before
purchase.
Ideally, this means retaining products, so that the public can’t
handle them prior to purchase – something perfectly appropriate for
foodstuffs, but generally considered by the public to be much less
acceptable for clothing and other merchandise. There are therefore
practical implications both for the layout of the outlets available
and for the way in which the public is invited to shop. Whereas in
most retail contexts the emphasis is on ensuring items are not
removed from the store without permission or in an uncontrolled
manner, in this case, there is an additional emphasis on ensuring
that unwanted materials are not placed on the premises.
Obviously, spectators and others will be checked for potentially
dangerous materials on entry to the site, but perfection is not
possible, and even harmless substances may be combined to create
something dangerous or otherwise unwanted. With this in mind, there
is even greater emphasis on retailers being especially
vigilant.
Conclusions
There is a serious risk of terrorist or other detrimental
activity associated with any Olympic Games. The political situation
of the UK – as a specific target of Al Qaida and of renegade former
IRA groups – together with the potential for groups not associated
with the UK, choosing the event to make their mark, means the risks
are probably greater than at any previous Olympics.
The supply chain is the means of delivering all required goods
to Olympic sites, and aside from the spectators themselves, is the
most likely means of delivering tools of terrorism to the sites.
The supply chain – more accurately, the wide variety of supply
chains – must be considered among the most likely ways open to
terrorists of delivering materials (and possibly people).
Consequently, serious consideration must be given to the supply
chain, the issues described above and the possible approaches to
reducing risk, including those cited above.
At this stage, the London Organising Committee of the Olympic
Games (LOCOG) has understandably not publicised any of its
intentions in respect of security. However, on 23 December 2009,
LOCOG advertised for staff to review security across the supply
chain for the 2012 Olympics. It is clear that the Committee’s
attitude to security, and the level of consideration given to
security, will be included in selection criteria for suppliers. It
is therefore essential that suppliers of goods and logistics
consider themselves to be part of the London 2012 security
apparatus and act accordingly to develop policies and programmes to
assure that their security is as effective as possible.
The Olympics is an extremely complex event, with massive numbers
of people involved and massive numbers of visitors. As a result,
the security of all those involved demands that all companies and
organisations within the broader supply chain manage and control
the security of their products and locations highly effectively
throughout the process from procurement to delivery.
Contact Vega for more information about
the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security
Strategy